

1. In a model democracy people will control government

People, not *the* people, are in control: the benefit to individuals, not groups, is what matters. They will control insofar as they can impose a discipline that is welcome to all of them. Thus, they do not just elect: except as a means to control, that would not be appealing. And they need not participate, as in Rousseauvian self-rule; this is deeply infeasible.

2. Collaboratively and inclusively

Collaboratively? Yes, despite the competitive, partisan character of democracy. Partisans must act jointly to impose or maintain common rules of competition: rules that are themselves kept out of the competitive fray, on pain of systemic instability. Inclusively? The rules must give respect as equals to all, despite their rival affiliations. A test of this: when people lament certain government decisions, out of interest or altruism, they will not see reason to resent them, as the work of an independent will. *Tough luck.*

People must have power as equals both a. *over the rules*, having the ability to change them; and b. *under the rules*: e.g. via the direct and indirect power detailed in 3 and 4 below. Power *over the rules* requires ready access to citizen-initiated referenda for most rules. But the referenda must not be majoritarian, else instability may result; they must ensure people's power to change the rules, while moderating partisan, reshaping ambitions. Power *under the rules* requires suitable selectional and operational constraints—

3. Via selectional constraints

Elections, periodic, universal, open and regulated, are a way for people to select their rulers, particularly the *domain-general* authorities that make and administer the laws. Should *domain-specific* authorities such as judges and electoral regulators be elected? No: they should be appointed under transparent, publicly accepted conditions, and have to operate with exact briefs, under strict constraints, with exposure to challenge. Elected representatives will be *responsive* to our interests, un-elected *indicative* of them.

4. And operational constraints

The system must control how government operates, not just how its officials are selected. The shared rules should support *containing* government discretion by requiring, e.g., residency, a rule of law, checks and balances, and argument by reasons relevant to all. But it should also enforce popular *consultation* (e.g.) and enable popular *contestation* (e.g.), entrenching freedom of expression, association, information, and an independent media. Domain-specific authorities will impose such constraints, an electoral system reinforce them.

5. Reducing government's dominating power.

We may not have any option but to live under government, on equal terms with others, but, as this ideal of democracy shows, government interference need not dominate. It need not be discretionary or arbitrary, being imposed *at will* on us and our fellows; it will operate under constraints that enjoy active (or standby) support in the community.

Indeed, these constraints may grow richer and richer under this containment rule: viz., that policies and processes should be supported by (only) reasons relevant for all. The common-reasons rule will privilege customary as well as constitutional considerations; e.g. *habeas corpus*, *nemo iudex*, separate not equal, education/health, gender equality.

If government operates under such constraints, which must be fairly welcome to all (else..), then it will operate under a degree of control by those it imposes on legally and fiscally. Insofar as government is constrained, it will not act at its own will but *on the people's terms*; people may lament its decisions (tough luck) but need not resent the deciding agency.